WHICH EXCHANGE RATE REGIME? CREDIBILITY AND EXCHANGE RATE NEUTRALITY

For highly-indebted and poorly-credible economies, the exchange rate is a ‘veil.’

Is it true that floating exchange rates protect the economy from the consequences of “sudden stops” in capital flows,[i] and grant policymakers greater flexibility in both managing demand and sustaining public debt?

I have recently submitted that the effectiveness of the exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism in a given country depends critically on three key variables (Bossone, 2018). These include the country’s

  • degree of financial integration into the global markets
  • size of its public debt (irrespective of currency denomination), and
  • level of policy credibility.

Exchange rate (non)neutrality

To see this, take a fully financially integrated country economy, suffering from weak policy credibility (based on its past policy track record), and assume that its policymakers adopt a floating exchange rate regime and commit to expanding public liabilities (debt and/or money) as much as necessary to stabilize output and employment at full capacity. With persistent expansion of the public liabilities, the policymakers would soon be faced with a dilemma:

  • they may either be forced to set the interest rates on debt liabilities high enough to prevent the exchange rate from falling at levels that would make the liabilities unsustainable, or
  • they may decide to monetize the debt as needed to keep interest rates low and to guarantee debt service.

Under the first option, the country would have to abandon its policy objective of stabilizing output and employment, and the resulting endogeneity of the interest rate would, de facto, amount to bringing back through the window the fixed exchange policy that was thrown out the door. Under the second option, the country would fail to achieve the objective anyway. In ex-ante (equilibrium) terms, and from the standpoint of the liabilities’ holders, the two options are equivalent since the expected losses from the risk of debt default (as compensated ex ante by higher interest rate premia) would equal the expected losses from currency depreciation (a form of default of its own).

Indeed, if the liabilities consist of public debt denominated in a foreign currency, investors face the risk of the country defaulting on its debt obligations at some future date and thus protect their investments by requiring an appropriate premium on the debt interest rate. On the other hand, if debt is denominated in the domestic currency, investors are protected against the risk of default (since the issuer can always monetize the debt),yet they are exposed to the risk of future currency depreciation and the real value loss of their asset due to the authorities’ commitment to unbounded debt monetization – stocks matter, not only flows. Thus, all else equal, both options carry the same probability of triggering a contractionary sudden stop, and the flexibility of floating exchange rates would play no role in influencing the economy’s real variables. Getting there might in fact be gradual, but the stop could be sudden.

The key role of financial integration

A crucial assumption underpinning this conclusion is the country’s full integration into the global financial markets, which removes systematic differences between the intertemporal behavior of resident and nonresident agents and between their valuations of the country’s liabilities. Under such conditions, when faced with the prospects of the country issuing “excess” liabilities,[ii] residents and nonresidents alike would replace at the relevant margin both domestic debt and money holdings with foreign assets deemed to be safer stores of value. It should be emphasized that the concept of excess liabilities here refers to a sustained issuance of public liabilities by a poorly credible economy, not to the financing of short-run budgetary policies to address transitory output gaps. Of course, residents would still demand the domestic currency for transaction and tax payment purposes, but such demand might not be enough to prevent the currency from depreciating if people move large share of wealth out of it and into foreign currency denominated assets.

This effect of financial integration would be further reinforced if i) the incidence of institutional investment over total domestic savings were high and ii) the distribution of domestic wealth were largely unequal, since both features would reduce “home bias” factors in investment strategies. In particular, as exchange rates often diverge considerably and persistently from purchasing power parities, institutional investors and the owners of large wealth are typically more sensitive than small savers to the need to protect their assets not just from domestic inflation but also from losses due to exchange rate dynamics. Such investors optimize their portfolios by taking a more global view of asset risks and returns than small savers and much more easily than small savers can (re)direct their investments across global markets. Since such investors would operate at the relevant margin, they would set the benchmarks for others to determine their own allocations choices. In other words, it is not necessary that all investors are global for the above allocation choices to hold; it is sufficient for relevant global investors to be seen as acting at the margin (Bartholdy and Kate (2004): they determine financial market prices.

It is often objected that resident and non-resident agents use different inflation rates to gauge their portfolio choices, with resident agents being primarily interested in protecting their wealth from the erosion due to domestic price increases and therefore being less responsive to exchange rate dynamics. In fact, to the extent that no frictions separate domestic and foreign markets, and that relevant portfolios of resident and nonresident agents are global, asset values are driven by the expected dynamics of international asset prices since, when valuing assets across international markets, global investors simply compare the expected dynamics of the nominal exchange rates of the relevant currencies. In such circumstances, domestic inflation rates are determined by the exchange rate dynamics (not the contrary), and exchange rate pass-through effect would grow with the openness of the economy, the flexibility of its prices, and the weakness of its policy credibility (Takhtamanova, 2008).

In a poorly-credible and highly-indebted economy higher inflation could materialize even at positive levels of the output gap as a reflection of the growth of public liabilities and their impact on the currency’s exchange rate. In fact, with full financial integration, high incidence of institutional savings, and large concentration of wealth, the issuance of excess liabilities (as defined above) would first prompt a larger demand for domestic assets (such as, real estate, safe–haven goods or commodities, and speculative assets) and would then increasingly cause capital outflows.

Based on the above assumptions, thus, the policy space available to a country grows narrower with its stock of liabilities – in whichever currency these are denominated – and is limited by the country’s level of policy credibility. The lower the credibility, the more would a floating regime be equivalent to a fixed regime and bear limited “insulation value” or no insulation value at all.

This equivalence resembles the neutrality property of the Modigliani-Miller (1958) theorem for corporate finance, whereby, under condition of perfect competition, the value of a firm’s capital is unaffected by the type of securities used to finance capital acquisition. Equivalently, if traded in an open (global) competitive market, a public liability must carry an identical value independently of its type and the exchange rate regime under which it is traded.

Obviously, we do not live in world of perfectly competitive markets and any departure from the ‘Modigliani-Miller’ paradigm (or any relaxation of its assumptions) softens the equivalence above. Yet, with all imperfections, not all investors can be fooled all the times and – once again, assuming full financial integration – a country could (and should) not ground its debt financing strategy on the expectation that domestic investors would be more willing than foreigners (or forced) to accept losses on their public debt holdings or that investors value the public debt differently depending on its currency of denomination.

The equivalence above does not imply that all countries are subject to the same intertemporal resource constraint. This is exactly where a country’s policy credibility comes into play. Credibility would be factored by investors into their own expectations and determine the “elasticity” of the country’s intertemporal resource constraint and, hence, the latitude of its policy space under floating rates. This elasticity would ultimately be a function of the markets’ evaluation of the sustainability of the country’s liabilities and its reflection on their price.

A country issuing a reserve currency or a country with high policy credibility would enjoy much greater policy space under floating rates than any other countries, since the elasticity of their intertemporal budget constraint, as determined by the markets, would be much higher than the others’.

The implications of the above discussion can be summarized as follows:

  • If affected by lack of policy credibility, an economy does not stand much to gain from floating rates in terms of both being more insulated from shocks and enjoying greater independence in the use of its policy levers.
  • Although, in principle, floating rate regimes grant policymakers greater flexibility than fixed regimes, flexibility varies inversely with the country’s policy credibility in the perception of the financial markets.
  • The larger is a country’s total public liability position, the more binding (less elastic) is the intertemporal resource constraint imposed by the markets on its policy choices.
  • In the case of financially integrated economies suffering from lack of policy credibility, their vulnerability to sudden stops is high irrespective of the currency of denomination of its liabilities.

In conclusion, for highly-indebted and poorly-credible economies, the exchange rate is a ‘veil’ in that markets detect their underlying risks regardless of the extant exchange rate regime and the currency of denomination of its public liabilities. Floating rates would not insulate such economies from exogenous shocks, nor would they grant greater independence to their policymakers, any more that fixed rates would.

Should weak economies go "fixed", then?

Let us clarify, first of all, that the term “weak” here refers to a fully financially integrated economy as defined above that is highly indebted, suffers from poor policy credibility, and undergoes a period or prolonged recession or stagnation, and let us also break the question in two separate ones.

First, should a weak economy move to a fixed exchange rate regime (or substitute its currency, for instance by dollarizing, or join a currency board or a monetary union)?

The fact that floating rates do not benefit a weak economy does not imply that the economy should then move to a fixed exchange rate regime, especially an irreversible one or one that is presumed to be so.

Taking such a step in the expectation that the economy would "import" discipline and credibility from the regime’s core country and using the new regime as an "external constraint" would not work, unless the country decided not just to import discipline and credibility but to replicate the whole economic and institutional structure of the core country. Otherwise, the risk for it would be too high of ending up in un unsustainable regime.

Rather than moving to an irreversibly fixed exchange rate regime, the country would be better off in the long term by going down the path of economic mismanagement and paying the consequences of it, until the situation forces an endogenous change in leadership and policy. As this happens, the country eventually recovers the benefits of exchange rate flexibility, and policy sovereignty more broadly. It should perhaps move to a managed float regime and pay close attention not to consign itself to financial market dependence through an inordinate expansion of its liabilities. While the new, more flexible exchange rate regime would not bring immediate benefits to the economy, it would at least open the door to a possible future “reversal of fortune”, with the fortune ultimately being in the country‘s own hands. On the other hand, the external constraint could condemn the country to permanent decline or secular stagnation.

Said differently, a country has to find its own way to sound policies and credible policy institutions, and not rely on external constraints: if it's capable of doing the former, it doesn't need the latter; if not, the latter do not help.

Second, what about a weak economy that is already a member of a fixed exchange rate arrangement and has lost space for effective fiscal policy: should it stay in at whatever price, exit the arrangement, or would it have other options available?

In the case of a weak economy that is already part of a fixed exchange rate arrangement and has exhausted its fiscal space, clearly, serious negative consequences may derive from either the “stay” or “exit” decision, and the options are essentially two:

  • A costly and risky “exit” and an extremely long and difficult road to restoring credibility under recovered national policy sovereignty, with the cost of exiting and restoring credibility being obviously a positive function of the credibility gap, or
  • A “stay” decision, supported by the adoption of “unconventional” fiscal policies (UFP) aimed to revitalize the economy without violating the rules of the exchange rate arrangement.

The latter is the easiest and least costly option. Yet, its implementation requires strong political leadership and economic policy stewardship, including to be able to persuade exchange rate partner countries and the financial markets that such policies’ are revenue neutral and legally legitimate.

Recently, I have evaluated three types of UFP developed in the literature (Bossone, 2019): pre-announced distortionary taxes (Correia et al, 2013), fiscal devaluations (Farhi et al, 2014), and fiscal money (Bossone and Cattaneo, 2018). The first type of UFP is not highly beneficial in a situation where the economy needs a strong and persistent demand stimulus, while the impact of the second type is not strong enough to reactivate output production and employment in the non-export sector of the economy. Only a fiscal money program could be calibrated to induce a demand shock that is commensurate to the economy’s output gap. Such conclusion is further reinforced taking into consideration recent evidence on the income multipliers (Realfonzo and Viscione, 2019).

To summarize and conclude

The above considerations rest on the assumptions that an economy is fully integrated into the global financial markets, domestic savings are highly institutionalized, and domestic wealth is largely concentrated. These factors cause relevant shares of domestic savings to be managed as global portfolios, driven by the expected dynamics of international asset prices. Under such assumptions, global financial markets play a dominant role in intertemporal resource allocation and have the power to determine the effectiveness of national macro policies. Their choices define the space for active and effective policies based on their judgement of the countries that adopt them. Whether such judgment is wright or wrong is not the issue, here; what matters is that it decides the elasticity (or the stringency) of the government’s intertemporal budget constraints.

In such a context, an economy with large public debt and poor policy credibility (in the eyes of the markets) would not stand to gain much in terms of shock insulation and policy autonomy from either i) issuing liabilities in its own (rather than a foreign) currency or ii) adopting a flexible (rather than a fixed) exchange rate regime. Moreover, all else being equal, the benefits from options i) and/or ii) increase with the degree of policy credibility of the country under consideration.

These conclusions, however, should not lead to conclude that a weak economy (as defined above) should be indifferent between the two types of exchange rate arrangement – especially if the fixed arrangement is supposed to be “irreversible” – and even less so to prefer the latter.

While a strong economy would greatly benefit from the policy flexibility and insulation power that floating rates make in principle possible, and should therefore have no reason to join a fixed arrangement (unless to protect its competitiveness from its own currency appreciation), the risks and costs of a fixed arrangement for a weak country should strongly discourage its policymakers from adopting it.

Finally, a weak country that is already part of a fixed exchange rate arrangement, has exhausted its fiscal space, and is trapped in a recession or stagnation, should seriously consider resorting to some form of “unconventional” fiscal policy with a view to revamping its economy.

REFERENCES

Bartholdy, J and B, Kate (2004), “Testing for Multiple Types of Marginal Investor in Ex-Day Pricing,” Multinational Finance Journal, Vol. 8, No. 3/4, 173-209.

Bossone, B (2019), “‘Unconventional’ Fiscal Policies,” Economonitor, 16 February.

Bossone, B and M Cattaneo (2018), “New ways of crisis settlement: Fiscal Money as a tool to fight economic stagnation,” paper presented at the conference on “A single model of Governance or tailored responses? Historical, economic and legal aspects of European Governance in the Crisis,” FernUniversität in Hagen, Germany 24 – 25 November 2016, published in Schiffauer (2018).

Calvo G A (1998) "Capital Flows and Capital-Market Crises: The Simple Economics of Sudden Stops," Journal of Applied Economics, 1 (1): 35–54.

Chen, Z and Z, Lei (2015), “Back to the Beginning: Does Investor Diversification Affect the Firm's Cost of Equity?” 9 October 9, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2538386 or .

Correira, I, Farhi, E, J P Nicolini and P Teles (2013), “Unconventional Fiscal Policy at the Zero Bound”, American Economic Review 103(4), 1172-1211.

DeLong B (2013) “Inspecting the Mechanism: Dealing with Sudden Stops, the Euro Periphery, the Exorbitant Privilege-Possessing Floating-Rate Sovereigns of the Global North, and the Debt”, DeLong Grasping Reality, October 27, 2013.

Dornbusch R, Goldfajn I and Valdés R O (1995) "Currency Crises and Collapses", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 219–293.

Eichengreen B and P Gupta (2016) “Managing Sudden Stops”, Policy Research Working Paper, 7639, The World Bank Group, April.

Farhi E, G Gopinath and O Itskhoki (2014), “Fiscal Devaluations,” Review of Economic Studies, April 2014, 81(2), 725-760.

Modigliani F and M H Miller (1958), “The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment”, The American Economic Review 48, 3 (June), 261-97.

Realfonzo, R and A Viscione (2019), “Una stima degli effetti della manovra e delle alternative possibili,” Economia e Politica, 8 Febbraio.

Schiffauer (ed.) P (2018), A single model of Governance or tailored responses? Historical, economic and legal aspects of European Governance in the Crisis,” Veröffentlichungen des Dimitris-Tsatsos-Instituts für Europäische Verfassungswissenschaften, Band 19, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, pp. 111-133, June.

Takhtamanova, Y (2008), “Understanding Changes in Exchange Rate Pass-Through,” Federal Reserve of San Francisco Working Paper Series

ENDNOTES

[i] “Sudden stops” are when capital inflows dry up abruptly (Eichengreen and Gupta, 2016). Introduced by Calvo (1998), the concept is defined as a sudden slowdown in private capital inflows into emerging market economies, and a corresponding sharp reversal from large current account deficits into smaller deficits or small surpluses, typically followed by a severe drop in private spending, credit to the private sector, and output, and by real exchange rate depreciation. The term “sudden stop” originate by a banker’s adage that “it is not speed that kills, it is the sudden stop”.

[ii] The concept of “excess” liabilities may emerge in circumstances such as when public liabilities exceed the value of nominal aggregate output and the former grows at least at the same rate of the latter, causing the difference between the two variables to grow indefinitely, beyond the point at which the holders of the liabilities might no longer be willing to absorb them and start diversifying their portfolio into alternative assets, including those denominated in foreign currencies. Notice that this would happen as a result of portfolio rebalancing effects, not necessarily higher inflation expectations. The latter could in fact be the consequence, not the causing factor, of such portfolio effects, as will be discussed below. This is suggestive of a “portfolio” theory of inflation, which would be especially relevant for small open and fully financially integrated economies and will be the subject of a forthcoming work.

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