This is in guest post format. What follows are key snips from a 68-page Brookings PDF.
This article isn't very long. My comments follow.
Nonbanks originated about half of all mortgages in 2016, and 75% of mortgages insured by the FHA or VA. Both shares are much higher than those observed at any point in the 2000s. We describe in this paper how nonbank mortgage companies are vulnerable to liquidity pressures in both their loan origination and servicing activities, and we document that this sector in aggregate appears to have minimal resources to bring to bear in a stress scenario. We show how these exact same liquidity issues unfolded during the financial crisis, leading to the failure of many nonbank companies, requests for government assistance, and harm to consumers. The extremely high share of nonbank lenders in FHA and VA lending suggests that nonbank failures could be quite costly to the government, but this issue has received very little attention in the housing-reform debate.
There is now considerable stress on Ginnie Mae operations from their nonbank counterparties:
“. . .Today almost two thirds of Ginnie Mae guaranteed securities are issued by independent mortgage banks. And independent mortgage bankers are using some of the most sophisticated financial engineering that this industry has ever seen. We are also seeing greater dependence on credit lines, securitization involving multiple players, and more frequent trading of servicing rights and all of these things have created a new and challenging environment for Ginnie Mae. . . . In other words, the risk is a lot higher and business models of our issuers are a lot more complex. Add in sharply higher annual volumes, and these risks are amplified many times over. . . . Also, we have depended on sheer luck. Luck that the economy does not fall into recession and increase mortgage delinquencies. Luck that our independent mortgage bankers remain able to access their lines of credit. And luck that nothing critical falls through the cracks. . . ”
Nonbank Share in $Billions
GSEs and Ginnie Mae
Although both the GSEs and Ginnie Mae guarantee mortgage-backed securities, there are a number of essential differences. In particular, Ginnie Mae servicers are exposed to greater liquidity strains, and a greater risk of absorbing credit loss, than GSE servicers.
Guarantee and Issuance of Securities
Guarantee and issuance of securities Both the GSEs and Ginnie Mae provide a guarantee to their mortgage-backed securities (MBS) investors that they will receive their payments of interest and principal on time. One crucial difference between these institutions, though, is who issues the underlying securities. The GSEs purchase loans from mortgage originators and issue the securities themselves. For Ginnie Mae MBS, financial institutions originate or purchase mortgages and then issue securities through the Ginnie Mae platform. In both cases, the loans in the securities have to meet certain underwriting standards and other requirements. The GSEs set the standards for the loans in their pools. For Ginnie Mae pools, the standards are set by the government agency that provides the insurance or guarantee on the mortgage (Federal Housing Administration, Veterans’ Administration, Farm Service Agency, Rural Housing Service, or Office of Public and Indian Housing).
Insurance Against Credit Risk
Another crucial difference between the GSEs and Ginnie Mae is who bears the credit risk associated with mortgage default. As shown in figure 3, for loans in GSE pools, the mortgage borrower takes the initial credit loss (in the form of her equity in the house), followed by the private mortgage insurance (PMI) company (if the mortgage has PMI), and then the GSE. For loans in Ginnie Mae pools, the mortgage borrower is again in the first-loss position, followed by the government entity that guarantees or insures the loan. However, the Ginnie issuer/servicer — unlike in the GSE case — is expected to bear any credit losses that the government insurer does not cover. Ginnie Mae covers credit losses only when the corporate resources of the issuer/servicer are exhausted.
Figure 12 shows the share of all mortgages in 2016 that were originated by nonbanks and insured by the FHA or VA.
Servicers with heavy concentrations may be more vulnerable to servicing-advance strains.
Consequences of a Nonbank Mortgage Company Failure
In the event of a failure of a nonbank mortgage company, there are three main types of parties who would bear losses: (1) consumers; (2) the U.S. government and, by extension, taxpayers; (3) the nonbanks, their shareholders, and their creditors.
If nonbank failure resulted in a reduction in mortgage origination capacity, it is not clear that other financial institutions would extend credit on the same terms to these borrowers, or perhaps even extend credit at all. This contraction in mortgage credit availability has the potential to be a significant drag on house prices.
The Brookings article is 68 pages long. The above snips capture the essence of their liquidity crisis claim but they provide much more detail.
Nonbanks are vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks, rising interest rates, home price declines and job losses, often with a bare minimum down payment.
This is happening while debt-to-income DTI ratios are on the rise and median FICO scores are dropping.
This is hardly surprising given homes are not affordable.
Failure is a Given
Brookings provides the failure hierarchy, and failure is a given.
To keep the latest bubble going, nonbanks kept lowering and lowering credit standards as home prices kept rising and rising.
This is a recipe for disaster, and disaster is at hand.
Housing Collapse Coming
The Brookings article reinforces my opinion.
Meanwhile, overdue debt is at a seven-year high. Distressed debt surged 11.5% in the fourth quarter.
The Financial Times also notes "More Americans are also falling behind on their mortgages, for which problematic debt levels rose 5.2 percent over the same period to $56.7 billion."
Deflationary Debt Trap Setup
These numbers are huge deflationary. When credit expands there is inflation. When credit contracts (think defaults, bankruptcies, mortgage walk-away events), debt deflation occurs.
Here's my definition of inflation: An increase in money supply and credit, with credit marked to market.
Deflation is the opposite: A decrease in money supply and credit, with credit marked to market.
- Credit card delinquencies are priced as if they will be paid back. They won't.
- As soon as recession hits, defaults and charge-offs will mount. In turn, this will reduce the amounts banks will be willing to lend.
- Subprime corporations who had been borrowing money quarter after quarter will find they are priced out of the market, unable to roll over their debt.
In a fiat credit-based global setup, this is how the real world works.
Seldom are opinions nearly unanimous. This is one of those times. Nearly everyone is looking for "inflation".
We have it! It's in home prices, junk bond prices, and equity prices.
Rear View Mirror Inflation
The inflation economists expect to happen, already has happened, in stocks, in home prices, in junk bonds.
They don't see it because they do not understand what inflation really is.
Debt Deflation Coming Up
I expect another round of asset-based deflation with consumer prices and US treasury yields to follow.
Mike "Mish" Shedlock